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Abstract 
The Pension B~nefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was established in 197 4 by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to insure the benefits of American retirees. The PBGC 
currently faces the threat of insolvency within the next 25 years, jeopardizing the financial 
security of millions of Americans. The purpose of this report is to bring to light the history of 
pension funds and the PBGC as well as to examine the implications of legislation that pertains to 
the Corporation. I will explain the factors that led to the bleak financial forecast of the PBGC and 
explore the attempted solutions to these problems. I will also perform a Chow Breakpoint test to 
determine whether the Pension Protection Act (PPC) of 2006 was effective in changing the rate 
at which the net financial position changes from year to year in the single-employer program. 
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Process Analysis Statement 
As an Actuarial Science major, it has been quite some time since I last wrote a research essay of 
this sort. To produce this work, I looked back on the skills that I developed in my grade 12 
composition class. I am most comfortable operating with algorithmic processes, so I took that 
approach. I was taught the standard process for writing a research paper and I stuck to that 
process. I started with developing a general idea for the direction of my paper and then I began to 
collect and read my sources. I took careful notes as I was reading and I color coded those notes 
to help me organize my ideas. I then created an outline to base the final work on. As I was 
writing the essay, in some cases, I felt that I needed more information so I collected more 
research along the way. I intended this paper to be understandable to anyone who would like to 
read it; I did not want it to only make sense to others who have studied insurance. I wanted to 
apply some of the skills that I learned in my Econometrics course, so I conducted a Chow 
Breakpoint test to draw some new conclusions. As a pension actuary, this topic is of the utmost 
importance to me. I learned a great deal of knowledge that will help me serve my clients better. 
The overall intent of this essay is to inform the general population about some of the threats 
facing pensioners as well as to inspire cooperation between corporations, Congress, and pension 
professionals. 
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1: Introduction 
Before delving into the specifics of the problems facing the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC), it is important to understand the origins and history of pensions. It is also 
necessary to recognize the basis of insurance and the nuances ofhow insurance is supposed to 
operate effectively and efficiently. In this section, I will also summarize some common problems 
that the insurance industry faces such as moral hazard and adverse selection. It may be helpful to 
refer to this section to better understand the reasons for the PBGC's deficit. 
The idea of pensions, defined payments made to retired workers, can be traced back to 
Ancient Rome. To ensure the loyalty of retired Roman soldiers, Augustus Caesar implemented 
the first known pension system in 13 B.C. Much like pensions today, the benefits that soldiers 
received were based on the length of their service. To qualify, soldiers had to serve in a legion 
for twenty years and remain in the reserves for an additional five years. Once a soldier had met 
the service requirements, they were entitled to a lump-sum payment which amounted to about 
thirteen years of the annual legionnaire' s salary. 1 The funding for such a program was initially 
provided through a general tax; however, Augustus Caesar soon created a distinct fund to cover 
these payments. A 5% inheritance tax ended up funding the retired soldiers' benefits until the fall 
of the Roman Empire. 2 Just as the Roman pension system was designed to inspire loyalty; 
modern pensions are designed, in part, to increase loyalty of employees to their employers. To 
qualify for their benefits, workers must often meet vesting requirements. In other words, they 
must work for the company for a specified amount of time before they are entitled to pension 
1 Vara, Vauhini. (2013, December 4). The Real Reason for Pensions. The New Yorker. Retrieved from 
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-real-reason-for-pensions 
2 Eich, Frank. (2010). Public Sector Pensions: Rationale and International Experiences [Abstract]. 
Pension Corporation Research. Retrieved from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1594122 
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payments. Many defined benefit (DB) pension plans also include years of service as a factor for 
determining the amount of the benefit. Pensions reward workers for staying with one company 
for several years. 
The remainder ofthe history of pensions presented in this report will focus on private-
sector pensions in the United States, because the PBGC does not insure public pension plans or 
foreign plans. The first recorded private pension plan did not appear in the United States until 
1875 when the American Express Company established one. Public pensions had existed in the 
U. S. prior to this, but until the 1870's most companies were relatively small and could not 
support a pension program.3 In the late 1800's, about 75% of males over the age of 65 were still 
working; generally, if a man stopped working it was because he was disabled and physically 
unable to continue working. 4 Back then, the prospect of eventually retiring and relaxing in the 
later part of life was not a reality for most Americans. 
The first legislation that directly dealt with pensions in the United States came in 1914 
and was a provision to the first federal income tax law which was enacted in 1913. The 1914 
legislation defined pension benefits as "ordinary and necessary business expenses," which meant 
that they became tax-deductible to employers. 5 This law further encouraged private businesses to 
set up pension funds to defer tax payments. By 1919, there were over 300 private pension plans 
in the United States; these plans covered about 15% of all hourly and salaried employees in the 
country at the time. A report by the Georgetown University Law Center credits the sharp rise in 
3 Employee Benefit Research Institute. (1998). History of Pension Plans. Washington, DC: n.a. 
Retrieved from https ://www. ebri. org/pu blications/facts/i ndex. cfm ?fa=0398afa ct 
4 Georgetown University Law Center. (2010). A Timeline of the Evolution of Retirement in the 
United States. Washington, DC: n.a. Retrieved from 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l049&context=legal 
5 Georgetown University Law Center 
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the number of private pension plans between 1914 and 1919 with the following incentives to the 
employers. Employers benefited from providing pension plans to their employees because it 
"attracted more workers, reduced labor turnover, and 'more [humanely] removed older, less 
productive employees"' from the workforce. 6 This reinforces the millennia old idea held by 
Augustus Caesar that providing benefits to employees benefits the employer. 
In the 1920's, two pieces oflegislation directly related to pension funds. The first, the 
Revenue Act of 1921, stated that trust income is taxed at the time when it is distributed to the 
employee and only the amount that exceeds the employee's own contributions. 7 In 1926, another 
Revenue Act became law; this Act pertained more directly to the private pension system than its 
predecessor did. The Revenue Act of 1926 made clear that pension plan trust income generated 
by pension plans was exempt from employees' current taxable income. In addition, rules for the 
establishment of pension funds were also included in the Revenue Act of 1926. The law states 
that "pension plans must be established for the exclusive benefit of 'some or all' employees."8 In 
other words, the law limited the ability for pension funds to be abused to the benefit of certain 
individuals or interest groups. 
By 1940, about 15% of American workers in the private-sector could expect to receive a 
pension when they retired. The life expectancy for an American in 1935 was 60 years; if a person 
survived to age 65, they would only be expected to live to age 77. 9 Just as the increase in life 
expectancy since 1935 has undermined much ofthe Social Security, it is a contributing factor to 
the insecurity of many private-sector pensions. Since most pensions now are paid as a lifetime 
benefit and sometimes include survivor benefits; the length of time that a person is expected to 
6 Georgetown University Law Center 
7 Georgetown University Law Center 
8 Georgetown University Law Center 
9 Georgetown University Law Center 
PBGC6 
live is a key factor for determining the amount of money needed to be set aside to meet future 
liabilities. 
The Revenue Act of 1942 provided more rules for pension funds which harkened back to 
ideas from the Revenue Act of 1926. The Revenue Act of 1942 clearly defined non-
discrimination tests that employers must satisfy for their plan to qualify for tax exemptions. The 
test allows three different ways for a plan to qualify. First, if a plan covers "70 percent of all full-
time employees", it qualifies. 10 The next way a plan can qualify is by covering "80 percent or 
more of all the employees who are eligible to benefit under the plan if 70 percent or more 
of all employees are eligible to benefits under the plan." 11 Finally, a plan can qualify if it 
provides coverage for a "group that the IRS determines is a bona fide employee group." 12 These 
rules were put in place to ensure that plans did not favor certain, often highly compensated, 
groups of employees such as executives. Companies have bent these rules in some cases due to a 
loose definition of the term "employee." 13 It is more common in recent years for employers to 
set up separate retirement plans for their executives and highly compensated employees that 
simply do not qualify for exemptions under the tax code. The Revenue Act of 1942 was a key 
piece of legislation that strengthened the average workers' rights pertaining to pensions. 
The 1950's also ushered in pension legislation in the United States, beginning with a new 
IRS Treasury Regulation in 1956. IRS Treasury Regulation Section 1.401-(b)(l)(i) provides a 
clear definition of pension plans. It states that a pension plan is ""a plan established and 
maintained by an employer primarily to provide systematically for the payment of definitely 
determinable benefits to his employees over a period of years, usually for life, after 
10 Georgetown University Law Center 
11 Georgetown University Law Center 
12 Georgetown University Law Center 
13 Georgetown University Law Center 
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retirement." 14 That same year, the IRS created Revenue Ruling 56-693 making clear that pension 
plan funds cannot be accessed until employment with the plan sponsor is terminated. 15 These 
rules are important because they clearly define and outline the expectations for pension plans. 
Two years later, in 1958, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act laid out reporting 
requirements for pension plans. For the first time, corporations had to disclose the financial 
procedures and wellbeing of their pension plans. 16 This act was a milestone for pension plans; it 
was the beginning of a legacy of increasing transparency regarding pension fund operations. 
By 1960, the percentage of workers in the United States that were covered by pension 
plans had grown to about 41% of all private-sector workers; this totals to at least 18.7 million 
workers. By 1970, this number had grown to 26.3 million workers making up 45% of all private-
sector workers. 17 Additional legislation, beginning with the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) which chartered the PBGC, will be covered in a later section. 
The PBGC, by design, is an insurance company; it is important to understand the origins 
of insurance as a concept, the ways that insurance is meant to function, and the common 
obstacles that are faced in the insurance industry. Insurance, in its most basic form, is a way for 
people to share risk. The idea of sharing risk is simply part of nature. For example, when a pack 
of wolves goes hunting, they are spreading the risk of injury or a failed hunt throughout the 
entire pack. Ancient humans also hunted in groups for many of the same reasons. 18 When people 
work together, the chances of success go up and the consequences of an individual's failure are 
14 Georgetown University Law Center 
15 Georgetown University Law Center 
16 Georgetown University Law Center 
17 Georgetown University Law Center 
18 The History of Insurance. (2014). lnvestopedia. Retrieved from 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/08/history-of-insurance.asp 
PBGC8 
greatly reduced. The first known written form of insurance appeared in the Code ofHammurabi 
which was conceived around 1754 B.C. While the code did not provide insurance in the 
traditional sense, it did allow for the citizens of Ancient Babylon to share risk. The Code allowed 
for debt forgiveness in the event of a personal calamities such as disability, death, or flooding. 19 
Essentially, this program allowed for these risks to be transferred from the borrows to the lenders 
and to be dispersed throughout a group rather than one individual. A flood may have been 
devastating for one farmer; however, it would have a much smaller impact on the lenders in most 
cases. 
The first more modem form of insurance took form to meet the needs of English 
merchants in the 17th century. Early forms of this marine insurance were relatively rudimentary; 
merchants entered agreements to give financial assistance to other merchants who had suffered a 
loss. While this did effectively disperse some of the risk of a ship sinking amongst the merchants 
who participated, there was still a problem; merchants did not know how much they would be 
liable for until after a loss had occurred. 20 This problem was soon solved by the process of 
underwriting. Once merchants had obtained an initial investment from venture capitalists, they 
would go to Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse to deliver a listing of their cargo to the underwriters 
and investors. The underwriters and investors who collected at Lloyd' s would take responsibility 
for certain portions of the cargo by signing the bottom of the manifest and paying set premiums. 
This is where the term underwriting originates. 21 Having many investors investing in small 
portions of a ship's cargo meant that if a ship sank, it would not financially ruin any one 
19 The History of Insurance 
20 How Insurance Works. {2012). Insurance Europe. Brussels, Belgium: n.a. Retrieved from 
https://www.insuranceeurope.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/How%20insurance%20works.pdf 
21 The History of Insurance 
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individual. Underwriters could also diversify their investments by financing small amounts of 
cargo on several different voyages rather than large amounts on one voyage. 
The next development that greatly increased the efficiency and effectiveness of insurance 
was the formalization of probability theory by Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in 1654. 
Probabilities were soon applied to risk which opened a wealth of opportunities for insurance 
providers. Premium rates could now be calculated more accurately and the process of 
underwriting became more formalized which ultimately resulted in more efficient and reasonably 
priced insurance. 22 Probability is the main driving factor behind modem insurance. For insurance 
providers to charge appropriate premiums; they must accurately forecast future losses which can 
only be done with the application of probability theory. 
To summarize, insurance works by individuals agreeing to share risk. With a great degree 
of accuracy, insurance companies can predict the expected frequency and severity of claims; this 
means that they can properly price the coverage that they provide. To make these predictions, 
actuaries often rely on past claim experience and advanced modeling techniques. Insurance 
providers operate most efficiently in an open and competitive market. Premiums will naturally 
find the balance between being high enough to cover expenses, claims, and profit while at the 
same time being less than the covered amount. It would not be to the benefit of consumers to 
purchase insurance unless the premiums are well below the covered amount. 23 Some other key 
insurance principles are indemnity, moral hazard, insurable interest, and adverse selection. In the 
insurance world, the term "indemnity" means that policyholders cannot benefit from 
experiencing a loss. In other words, the coverage cannot exceed the true value of the thing being 
insured. When people can benefit from experiencing a loss a moral hazard is created. They will 
22 The History of Insurance 
23 How Insurance Works 
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be incentivized to either intentionally create a loss or will be discouraged from properly 
managing their risks. Moral hazard is not only a problem when the coverage amount exceeds the 
value of the thing being insured, but it applies to all insurance. Policyholders may act differently 
and manage risks differently once they obtain coverage. Insurance policies must be carefully 
worded to ensure that the insureds are still properly reducing risks, otherwise the frequency and 
severity of claims will artificially increase resulting in higher premium prices. 24 The idea of an 
insurable interest simply means that an individual can only purchase insurance for something if 
they have a legitimate reason for doing so. The risk must be definable and measurable in 
financial terms to be insurable. 25 For example, corporations can take out life insurance policies 
on their executives because if an executive were to die, the company would face real, 
quantifiable costs such as the cost of finding a replacement. As an individual, however, I could 
not take out an insurance policy on someone unless I relied on their income or was responsible 
for their end of life expenses. If individuals could take out life insurance policies on anyone they 
pleased, it would create a serious moral hazard problem. The final insurance concept that I would 
like to address here is the idea of adverse selection. Adverse selection means that, by nature, the 
more risk that a person has, the more likely they are to purchase insurance to cover those risks. 
This problem is addressed by underwriting and charging premiums that truly reflect the value of 
the coverage. Insurance in the real world is far more nuanced because it is highly regulated; 
however, the basic concepts are applicable in any case, including pension insurance. 
24 How Insurance Works 
25 How Insurance Works 
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II: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
In 1963, Studebaker-Packard Corporation discontinued operations at its plant in South 
Bend, Indiana and terminated its employee pension plan.26 At the time of the plant' s closing, the 
pension fund for hourly workers did not have sufficient assets to cover its liabilities. Thus, the 
accrued benefits of over 7300 workers were reduced by 85 to 100 percent. 27 These workers had 
been promised pension benefits and, in many cases, were relying on those benefits as their sole 
source of income during retirement. This financial disaster highlighted the need for pension 
management reform and protection for workers. In 1967, Senator Jacob Javits from New York 
began creating legislation to help meet this need. 28 In 197 4, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Gerald R. Ford. 
ERISA established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to insure pension plans and protect 
the financial security of Americans. The President eloquently described the intent of the PBGC; 
he said, "Under this law, the men and women of our labor force will have more clearly defined 
rights to pension funds and greater assurances that retirement dollars will be there when they are 
needed."29 Unfortunately, the security that the PBGC was intended to provide is coming more 
and more into question. The remainder ofthis section will focus on the operations of the PBGC, 
26 History of PBGC. (n.d.). Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Washington, DC: n.a. 
Retrieved from https://www.pbgc.gov/about/who-we-are/pg/ history-of-pbgc 
27 Brown, Jeffrey R. (2007). Guaranteed Trouble: The Economic Effects of the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation. National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from 
htt p://nber.org/papers/w13438 
28 History of PBGC 
29 History of PBGC 
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the difficulties that the Corporation is facing, the reasons for those problems, and the potential 
solution. 
The PBGC operates two separate types of pension plans, single-employer plans and 
multiemployer plans. These programs are run separately and receive separate sources of funding. 
Funds from one program cannot be used to assist the other and financial results must be reported 
separately. The 2016 Annual Performance Report published by the PBGC reports that they 
currently insure over 40 million Americans who belong to defined benefit pension plans. The 
Corporation is currently in charge of paying the benefits of over 1.5 million workers and retirees 
who were part of pension plans that have failed. 30 Without the PBGC' s insurance services, these 
Americans would have little to no retirement income. The PBGC is responsible for covering 
close to 24,000 pension plans; since its inception in 1974, it has paid benefits to over 4,800 
single-employer and multi-employer plans that failed. In the 2016 fiscal year, the PBGC made 
$5.8 billion worth of benefit payments. 31 
The multiemployer program run by the PBGC insures plans that are created through 
collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers. The event that is being covered 
in the case ofmultiemployer plans is insolvency. When a multiemployer plan becomes insolvent, 
the PBGC provides financial assistance to pay benefits up to the amount guaranteed by law. The 
common industries covered by these plans are construction, hospitality, transportation, and 
mining. 32 The PBGC's role in aiding multi-employer plans goes beyond simply paying benefits. 
In addition to providing financial assistance, the PBGC also provides "technical assistance to 
30 Annual Report 2016. {2016). Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Washington, DC: n.a. 
Retrieved from httos ://www. p bgc.gov /Docu ments/ 20 16-An n ua I-Report. pdf 
31 Annual Report 2016 
32 Annual Report 2016 
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multiemployer plan administrators, service providers, and other stakeholders"33 The PBGC 
reports that "the multiemployer insurance program is likely to run out of money by the end of 
2025."34 The PBGC is currently working to keep this program afloat to protect Americans. The 
reasons for this bleak projection as well as the steps being taken to prevent it from coming to 
fruition will be discussed at a later point. 
The single-employer program, as the name suggests, covers pension plans that are 
sponsored by a single employer. When a covered single-employer plan terminates, the PBGC 
becomes responsible for paying the benefits of that plan. Unlike multiemployer program that 
provides financial assistance to the plan, the single-employer program assumes the responsibility 
of paying each individual pensioner. 35 The PBGC generally must step in because ofthe plan 
sponsor going bankrupt or discontinuing operations while their plan is underfunded. When this 
happens, the PBGC takes control of the "plan' s assets, administration, and payment of plan 
benefits up to the legal limits. "36 Single-employer plans can terminate without the PBGC having 
to take control of the plan if they are funded enough to pay all the benefits that the workers have 
already become entitled to. The single-employer program has a more positive outlook than the 
multiemployer plan; however, it is still currently facing a large deficit. 37 Later, I will discuss the 
issues that led to the current underfunding of the single-employer plan and highlight the steps 
that are being taken to improve the program. 
Before discussing the funding shortfalls in the PBGC' s programs, it is important to 
explain ho.w the PBGC calculates its assets and liabilities. For both programs that it runs, the 
33 Annual Report 2016 
34 Annual Report 2016 
35 MPRA Report. (2016). Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Washington, DC: n.a . 
Retrieved from https ://www. pbgc.gov /s ites/ de fa u lt/fi I es/ legacy/ docs/M P RA-Report. pdf 
36 Annual Report 2016 
37 Annual Report 2016 
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PBGC separates its business activities into the categories of "Underwriting Activity" and 
"Financial Activity."38 Underwriting Activity relates to the process of collecting premiums in 
return for providing insurance coverage. The PBGC includes both realized losses and expected 
probable losses when reporting Underwriting Activity. Underwriting Activity also includes 
"actuarial adjustments based on actuarial assumptions, such as mortality"39 Calculating expected 
benefits for pensioners is not an exact science, it is based on actuarial methods that include 
several different assumptions. When these assumptions such as interest and mortality rates 
change over time, it can have a drastic impact on the value of liabilities; therefore, it is accounted 
for in the PBGC's financial reporting. The Financial Activity that the PBGC reports relates to the 
investment performance of its assets and liabilities. The PBGC's assets include the premiums it 
collects, the assets of insured plans that have terminated, and recoveries from those pl~n 
sponsors. Future benefit liabilities ofthe PBGC include "those future benefits, under statutory 
limits, that PBGC has assumed following distress or involuntary terminations."40 The difference 
between the assets that the PBGC controls and the liabilities that it is responsible for is known as 
its net financial position. 
The net financial positon for the multiemployer program as of September 3 0, 2016 was 
$(20,580) million. The net financial position for the single-employer program as of the same date 
was $(58,833) million. The PBGC's annual report notes that "the Corporation has sufficient 
liquidity to meet its obligations (liabilities) for a significant number of years; however, neither 
program at present has the resources to fully satisfy the PBGC's long-term obligations to plan 
38 Annual Report 2016 
39 Annual Report 2016 
40 Annual Report 2016 
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participants."41 This leads into the next topic of discussion: the reasons why the PBC is in such 
financial turmoil. 
One of the biggest problems that the PBGC faces is its entanglement with the United 
States Government. The PBGC was created by Congress and the premiums are set in law by 
Congress. The PBGC, however, does not receive any monetary assistance from taxpayers; 
ERISA mandates that the PBGC be completely self-financed. In addition, the United States 
Federal Government, under ERISA, is not responsible for any liabilities that the PBGC acquires. 
The Corporation' s sources of income are premiums, investment returns, and acquired assets from 
terminated plans that are trusteed by the PBGC. The benefit payments are regulated by federal 
law and are subject to the original provisions oftrusteed plans. 42 Because premiums are decided 
by Congress, political factors influence the rates charged. The lawmakers who set these 
premiums are under enormous pressure from interest groups, especially unions, to keep 
premiums low. Government officials have been influenced to reduce contribution requirements 
so that employers have more funds available in the short term for things such as hiring new 
workers and increasing wages. 43 Essentially, although the PBGC is a separate entity from the 
Federal Government, the Federal Government restricts them from charging premiums that are 
actuarially appropriate for the coverage that they provide. In 2005, the PBGC estimated that 
premiums would have to increase by a factor of 6.5 times to fully fund expected claims. 44 This is 
a large contributing factor to the current deficits in both the single-employer and multi-employer 
plans; they simply are not collecting enough money to cover expenses. 
41 Annual Report 2016 
42 Annual Report 2016 
43 Blahous, C. (2011). The Private-Sector Pension Predicament. Policy Review, (170), 15-33 
44 Blahous 
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Another problem that has contributed to the PBGC's deficits is a result of political 
interference; certain industries are permitted to use higher discount rates for funding calculations 
than others. The airline industry as well as certain automakers have received special privileges. 45 
The effect of using these higher discount rates is that future liabilities are undervalued. When 
liabilities are undervalued, the required contributions are lower than they should be which puts 
the plan in danger of not being able to fulfill its obligations in the future. 
One issue with pension insurance as a concept is it inherently creates a moral hazard. The 
safety net that the insurance provides to protect workers and retirees, in some cases, inspires 
corporations to take more risky actions. Employers can reduce the costs of funding their pension 
plans by investing in riskier assets that have the potential for higher rewards. If the fund 's 
investments perform well, the companies need to invest less. If the investments do not perform 
well and the plan becomes insolvent, the PBGC takes the loss. It is in the interest of corporations 
to reduce expenses to report higher earnings, thus raising the stock price. Companies have 
chosen to report higher earnings in the short run rather than meet the long-term obligations they 
owe to their employees. 46 The PBGC does not have the power to regulate the investment policy 
of the pension funds it insures, so it cannot prevent fund managers from making poor investment 
decisionsY In addition, the PBGC does not have the power to enforce contribution requirements. 
One plan sponsor in the airline industry simply stopped making contributions once they had filed 
bankruptcy and because the PBGC is an unsecured creditor, it could not place a lien on the 
skipped contributions. The fact that their pensions are insured also reduces the incentive of 
workers to investigate the state of the pension fund to make sure that adequate contributions are 
45 Blahous 
46 Hudson, M. (2005}. TH E $4.7 TRILLION PYRAMID. (Cover story) . Harper's Magazine, 
310(1859}, 35-40. 
47 Blahous 
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being made and that the money is being invested wisely. 48 The program intended to increase 
retirement security of Americans may have contributed to the problem. The benefits of the 
PBGC, however far outweigh this problem, because without it millions of Americans would 
have no access to the retirement income they were promised. 
One of ERISA' s features was it requires all corporate pensions to purchase insurance 
from the PBGC. 49 This means that unlike other forms of insurance, the PBGC cannot screen out 
the risks that it feels to be too great. Plans do have to meet certain requirements to qualify for 
PBGC insurance; however, these requirements are written in law rather than being designed by 
the PBGC. 
Another contributing factor that has contributed to underfunding of pension plans is that 
fund managers predicted that they could earn much higher rates of return on their investments 
than they experienced. An extreme example of this phenomenon is demonstrated by a study 
which Milliman USA, an employee benefits consulting firm, conducted. The study looked at the 
returns that the 1 00 largest firms in America expected to earn on their pension funds from 2000 
to 2003. In 2000 and 2001 , the median expected rate of return was 9.5 percent. In 2002, fund 
managers expected to earn 9.25% as a median and in 2003 this number was 8.55%. The actual 
average rate of return earned on these funds between the beginning of 2000 and the end of 2003 
was just 1.3%. 50 The underperformance of the market compared to such high projections resulted 
in many plans that are insured by the PBGC becoming more of an insolvency risk. 
Another issue that has led to the probable insolvency of so many pension plans in 
America is that plan sponsors faced barriers to overfunding in times when the market was 
48 Blahous 
49 Hudson 
50 Hudson 
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performing well. Before the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PP A) was passed, plans could not 
deduct contributions that exceeded 100% ofthe plan's current liability. The PPA increased this 
percentage to 150% which is a step in the right direction; however, the problems that were 
created before this new rule still linger. In the late 1990's the market surge spurred on by the 
internet age caused plan assets to grow at above average rates. Many employers stopped making 
contributions during this time because investment returns caused their plans to be fully funded. 
When these unusual market conditions ceased, however, the funding percentages dropped to well 
below what they would have been if companies had overfunded during this time. 51 The 
restrictions placed on plan sponsors as to how much they can set aside in their pension funds has 
had a negative impact on pension security. 
The United States Federal Government benefits by reducing required pension plan 
contributions. Because contributions to pension plans are tax-deductible, the government can 
increase their revenue by lowering contribution requirements. This tactic was used to help fund 
federal spending in 201052 This sort ofbehavior has consequences for American workers and 
retirees; it places their retirement income sources at risk. 
A problem that is specific to multiemployer plans is the phenomenon of "double-
counting." The premiums that the PBGC collects are counted both for the Corporation's 
operations and as a source of income for the Federal government. The Government considers 
these inflows when making funding decisions for separate programs, even though these 
premiums are not funded by taxpayers. 53 The fact that premium rates are set by the Government 
51 Blahous 
52 Blahous. 
53 Verona, Macauley. (2016, September 8). America's Pension Plan Problem. News Media 
Alliance. Retrieved from 
https://www.newsmediaalliance.org/advocacyl/americas-pension-plan-problem/ 
PBGC 19 
instead of by the PBGC adds an extra layer of complexity to this problem. The threat is that these 
funds may not actually be used to insure the retirement interests of Americans as intended. This 
may also lead to premiums being artificially inflated to generate government revenue which 
could mean a massive expense for plan sponsors and in turn could further jeopardize their plan' s 
funding status. 54 If corporations that are already struggling financially are forced to pay 
premiums that do not truly reflect the value of the insurance they are receiving they may be 
forced to terminate their plans and add even more liability to the PBGC. Fortunately, this 
phenomenon has been addressed by H.R. 4955, the Pension and Budget Integrity Act (PBIA). 
The PBIA's main feature is ending the practice of "double-counting."55 The PBIA has attracted 
attention from leaders in the employee benefits consulting field. Most notably, the CEO of 
Mercer, Julio Portalatin wrote a letter to Congress voicing his support from the PBIA. 56 Mr. 
Portalatin noted that the PBGC premium increases in 2012, 2013, and 2015 are 
"counterproductive to the goals of enhancing the agency's financial health and improving 
American's retirement security."57 He goes on to say that these sharp premium increases 
"undermine employers' desire to maintain pension plans."58 This is one area where Congress has 
taken steps necessary to address a problem with the pension system; since this legislation is 
relatively new it will be important to continue analyzing its impact over the next several years. 
To summarize, several different factors have led to the current poor financial security of 
the defined benefit pension system. Government interference with the PBGC's operations as well 
54 Verona 
55 Verona 
56 Porta latin, Julio A. (2016, June 8). RE: Support for the Pension and Budget Integrity Act 
(HR 4955). New York, NY. Retrieved from 
https://www. mercer. com/ content/dam/mercer /attach ments/globa 1/ us-2016-j u lio-porta latin-letter-
pension-and-budget-integrity-act -mercer. pdf 
57 Portalatin 
58 Portalatin 
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as the structure in which pension funds are allowed by the government to operate are the main 
driving factors behind the current underfunding problems. Since the original inception of ERISA 
in 1974, many new regulations have been added and old ones have been amended. Congress has 
been moving in the right direction with pension reform; however, there is still much work to do 
to preserve the retirement income of millions of Americans. 
III. Pension Protection Act of 2006 
Now that many of the problems with the defined benefit pension sector have been 
addressed, my focus shifts the Pension Protection Act of 2006(PPA). I will analyze the solutions 
that the PP A intended to bring to the table and I will perform a statistical test to determine 
whether this policy has been effective in influencing the rate at which the net financial position 
ofthe single-employer program changes from year to year. All the data for this analysis was 
taken directly from the PBGC' s website available at www.pbgc.gov. 59 
Rather than getting into the nitty gritty of the almost 400-page piece of legislation, I will 
summarize some of its key features. The PP A was designed to address some of the funding 
loopholes that plan sponsors were using to minimize contributions to their pension funds. 60 The 
following summary is provided by the United States Government; it was made available at 
www.congress.gov. 
Title 1: Reform of Funding Rules for Single-Employer Defined Benefit 
Pension Plans: Subtitle A: Amendments to Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974- (Sec. 101) Amends the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) to repeal existing funding rules for defined benefit pension 
plans for plan years beginning after 2007. Establishes new minimum funding 
standards for single-employer defined benefit pension plans, single-employer 
money purchase plans, and multiemployer plans. Requires employers to pay 
59 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. {2016). 2015 Pension Insurance Data Tables 
[Excel File]. Retrieved from https://www.pbgc.gov/prac/data-books 
60 What is the Pension Protection Act? (2017). Human Resources MBA. Retrieved from 
http ://www. h u rna n resou rcesm ba . net/fag/what-is-the-pension-protection-act/ 
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certain minimum required contributions. Allows the Secretary of the Treasury to: 
(1) waive minimum funding standards in the event of a temporary substantial 
business hardship for single-employer plans or a substantial business hardship in 
the case of a multiemployer plan if application of the standard would be adverse 
to the interests of plan participants in the aggregate; (2) require a single-
employer maintaining such a plan to provide security to such plan as a condition 
for granting or modifying a waiver. Limits the number of waivers that may be 
granted. Prohibits any amendment which increases the liability of a plan from 
being adopted if a waiver is in effect. 51 
The reason that I am only conducting this study on the single-employer program rather than the 
multiemployer program is that the multiemployer program is currently experiencing exponential 
growth in the level of underfunding. 62 No statistical test is required to see that the PP A has done 
little to protect the financial stability of the multiemployer program, despite efforts to do so. The 
change in the single-employer program' s net financial position over time requires more 
investigation. There is a downward trend in the funding status ofthis program between 1995 and 
2016; however, I am interested in whether the PPA had a significant impact on the rate ofthis 
trend. 63 To determine whether the PPA had a significant impact, I conducted a Chow Breakpoint 
test on the data. The Chow Breakpoint test is a common test used to analyze structure change 
within data. The test essentially separates the data into two separate time intervals and identifies 
whether the regression results are statistically different between those intervals. For the purposes 
of my test, I have chosen to identify 2007 as the breakpoint; this is because the PP A applies to 
plan years beginning with 2007. It is important to note that the figures that I used are reported as 
millions of United States dollars. I used EViews statistical software to conduct my analysis. 
61 United States Congress. (2006). Pension Protection Act of 2006 (H.R 4). [Summary]. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved from 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/00004 
62 See Appendix Chart 1. 
63 See Appendix Chart 2. 
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The trend model for the single-employer data is 
Where 
The estimated equation is 
SENFPr ={Jjt + fJO + Ur 
SENFP = Single Employer Net Financial Position($millions) 
t = Time Trend 
fJO = Intercept 
Ut = Error Term 
SENFP, = -1668.058t + 5886.877 
The standard errors for the estimated coefficients can be found in the appendix. 64 
The null hypothesis for my Chow Breakpoint test is that there is no break in the data in 2007. 
The test yielded an F-statistic of 1.312268 which has a probability value of 0.2938. Because 
0.2938 is greater than 0.10, I fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level. To 
summarize, this test shows that the PP A did not significantly influence the rate at which the net 
financial position of the PBGC's single-employer program changes from year to year, starting in 
2007. 
IV. Conclusions 
The retirement security of millions of Americans is at stake. Poor management of pension 
funds as well as poorly designed legislation has led to many U.S. pension plans to face the risk of 
not being financially able to meet their pension obligations. The Corporation that was set up to 
insure these benefits, the PBGC, does not currently possess the tools necessary to effectively 
meet is demand either. While recent legislation such as the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and 
64 See Appendix Chart 3. 
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the Pension and Budget Integrity Act are a step in the right direction, they have not been entirely 
effective to this point. Solving these problems for the benefit of American workers and retirees 
will take cooperation between the Federal Government, employee benefits consulting experts, 
and plan sponsors. 
PBGC24 
Appendix: 
Chart 1. Multiemployer Program Net Financial Position in Millions of U.S. Dollars 
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Chart 3. Standard Errors of Estimated Coefficients 
Standard 
Coefficient Error 
13'1 243.1614 
13'o 2983 .066 
Chart 4. Net Financial Position Data 
Net Financial Positions (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Year Multiemployer Program Single-Employer Program 
1995 192 -315 
1996 124 869 
1997 219 3481 
1998 341 5012 
1999 199 7038 
2000 267 9704 
2001 116 7732 
2002 158 -3638 
2003 -261 -11238 
2004 -236 -23305 
2005 -335 -22776 
2006 -739 -18142 
•2007 -955 -13111 
2008 -473 -10678 
2009 -869 -21077 
2010 -1436 -21594 
2011 -2770 -23266 
2012 -5237 -29142 
2013 -8258 -27381 
2.014 -42434 -19338 
2015 -52284 -24065 
2016 -58833 -20580 
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